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Abstract 
 
Hallmark sporting events have evolved from a competitive opportunity of showing national pride 
to commercially driven entertainment entities which seem to prosper from the economic stimulation of the 
event. Due to the growing popularity of these mega-sport events, cities and countries around the world are 
continually evaluating the potential of using these events to draw attention to the host. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to the controversial discussion of whether or not to invest in hosting a mega-sport event. Every 
stage of sporting events can reveal positive or negative influences, starting from a competitive bidding 
process, to the construction of infrastructure, and to the post-event effects. This thesis will focus on three 
aspects: (i) the anticipated impact of hosting a mega sport event in the short run versus long run by analyzing 
notable macroeconomic variables: expenditure, investment, and government spending; (ii) econometric 
analysis of long run panel data of gross domestic product per capita growth; and (iii) will also attempt to 
answer the question of why hosting a mega sport event did or did not work via. Applying basic 
macroeconomic principles, the original hypothesis suggested that the impact of hosting a mega-sport event 
would result in an expected short-run burst domestic product per capita (GDPPC) followed by a slight 
leveling off of the GDPPC in the medium and long term. Applying linear regressions over a twenty-year 
period, it is possible to evaluate the impact of hosting an event. Such analysis of the data indicated that it 
may be worthwhile for a country to host the World Cup but hosting either of the Olympic Games would 
likely be a costly endeavor.  
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Overview/Intro 
 
High-profile sporting events have increasingly been advocated by governments and marketing 
and decision-making strategists as high impact catalysts for economic development in cities and nations. 
In particular, the events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games draw significant numbers 
of domestic and international tourists, attract television and corporate sponsorship (Lee, C; 2009).1 Since 
1984, the competition to host the Olympic Games has grown immensely. Economists repeatedly refer to 
key goals/outcomes behind why cities are so keen to host such an event. These factors that are often 
though tot motivate corporate involvement and public support include: the opportunity to advertise 
products to a global audience (raising a host country’s or city’s corporate investment value), leverage 
business opportunities in export and new investment, enhance the tourist industry of the host country, and 
boost citizen pride (Barney, 2002).2 In reality, the Games begin when cities and nations first devote 
enormous amounts of organizational time and money with somewhat outlandish expectations of 
benefiting both empirically and implicitly. Hosting major sporting events is associated with the belief that 
the ‘buzz’ will draw sizeable crowds and tourists who will spend money in the city/nation. Further, 
another perceived economic benefit is than an event is a powerful stimulus due to multiplier effects, 
employment bonuses, and the overall economic stimulus supplement that a major sporting event naturally 
offers. On the other hand, organizers often overlook or discount the operational, implicit, and opportunity 
costs that are associated with this type of event and assume unreasonable expectations. Despite the natural 
overhyped characteristic linked with mega-sport events, the initial default policy/economic policy 
expectation is that of a city/nation can afford to host a mega event, the benefits that a nation implicitly 
acquires, in addition to its tangible benefits (money, revenue), outweigh these inherent up-front incurred 
costs.  
 
 
 
 
																																																						
1 Lee, C., Taylor, T.; University of Technology (Sydney); Journal of Macroeconomics; Critical Reflections on the Economic Impact Assessment 
of a Mega-Event: The Case of the 2002 FIFA World Cup; https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0261517704000640/1-s2.0-S0261517704000640-
main.pdf?_tid=933e6f76-8351-4eed-bc55-020b2952ac15&acdnat=1537848847_0c6d34aa900e40113854713150398b22  
2R. Barney, S. Wenn, S. Martyn; Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism, The 
University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City (2002) 
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The merit of hosting a sporting event is much more than the event itself where sporting events, such as the 
World Cup and Summer/Winter Olympic Games, are viewed as valuable opportunities for the host 
nations and urban economies to stimulate economic growth, urban renewal, employment and improve 
nation stature. There are also intangible benefits (legacy benefits) (Preuss, 2011) of hosting such as: (i) 
media presence which can lead to long-term increase in tourism and be an attraction of new foreign 
investment; (ii) long-lasting infrastructure with a potential for a variety of uses; (iii) and a signal of trade 
liberalization that promotes greater trade activity in the long term. If such results were consistently true, 
however, then every city, state and nation-governing body would apply to host this world invitational 
event. Hosting mega-events requires significant investments. Zimbalist (2015) notes emerging economies 
like China, Brazil, and South Africa have increasingly perceived “mega-events as a sort of coming-out 
party signaling that [they are] now a modernized economy, ready to make [their] presence felt in world 
trade and politics.”3 Their intentions may be noble, but the intention of using mega-events as a “coming-
out party” means developing countries hoping to host them need to make massive investments. Notably, 
the 2004 Sumer Olympic Games in Greece cost roughly $16 billion, 2014 World Cup cost Brazil $20 
billion, and the 2008 Olympics cost Beijing roughly $40 billion. Prior to the bidding process, should 
overestimate the total incurred costs and underestimate the total produced benefits.    
 
 
 
 
  
																																																						
3 Zimbalist 2015; Is It Worth It?; Finance and Development; Vol. 47 p. 8-11 
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Literature Review 
In recent decades, major sporting events have been recognized as an opportunity to stimulate 
economic growth through government expenditure, foreign investment, new money consumption and the 
introduction of future trade possibilities. Substantiated author and grad student publications have 
illuminated analysis and measurements of the economic impacts of these major sporting events. Their 
research has evaluated whether or not mega-events lead to access to previously inaccessible funds and 
increased investments. These investments would theoretically come from supranational organizations, 
private stakeholders, public stakeholders, or tourists (Barrios). We also consider whether or not these new 
expenditures and investments have the direct, indirect, multiplicative, or induced effects (Kasimati). In 
this field, Kasimati (date), and Lee (date) recognize the different economic approaches that have been 
considered when trying to measure the impact that hosting mega sporting events incur. On the other hand, 
Brunet, Overmyer and Plenderleith illustrate strict cost-benefit analysis to indicate the direct impact on 
the hosts of the major sporting events. Furthermore, studies conducted from Preuss (date) and Collett of 
Colorado College (date) justify the substantial economic burden incurred for the organization of the 
mega-event in the face of the consequent increase in consumption spending, foreign investment, and 
employment. In this line of research are inserted contributions from: (i) Kasimati (date) and Lee (date) 
that demonstrate the importance of incorporating multipliers into the calculations of macroeconomic 
impact; (ii) Meurer (date), ERNST & Young Terco (2015) and Collett (date) indicate how the 
introduction of new money directly and indirectly connected to a mega event, specifically the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympics, the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympics, 2002 FIFA World Cup in South Korea/Japan, 
and the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil; (iii) and Gong (2008) that theorizes the fragility of the mega 
investment profile, indicating that a mega-sporting event is a double-edged sword. If it could be used in 
the right way, it would bring magnificent benefits; otherwise the hosting opportunity of a mega-sporting 
event would be costly. 
Conversely, there are some authors that tend to analyze the adverse effects and consequences that 
negatively impact economies the of the host country. Barrios and Russel of Harvard Kennedy School 
(2011) as well as Plenderleith (2012) argue that the vast majority of literature fails to substantiate a 
relationship between mega-events and the increased economic activity. Overall, the expected economic 
benefits of hosting an event are vastly overstated and the real benefits are outweighed by the costs 
associated with event preparation and execution. The only case where the argument of failed 
substantiation could be justified was made by Kim (2008) and (Lee, 2002) who theorized that in the long 
term, the Games and world mega events significantly contribute in economic reputation and stature.  
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The first part of this paper will use macroeconomic theory and analysis to create a generalized 
hypothesis as to what should happen if a city or country decides to take on the responsibility of hosting 
such an event. Several authors have ventured into the idea of analyzing the theoretical short term and long 
term benefits and costs of hosting mega events. One of the most significant of which is Professor Victor 
Matheson (2006) of Holy Cross, who measured the impact of such events through data and logic and 
concluded that hosting these events are seemingly high costs and low reward. The early spending may 
spur quick economic activity, but the tangible benefits in the end are outweighed by the initial costs. He 
also noted economic variations in hosting economies. The data gathered for the econometric side of this 
thesis has a wide variance in term of economic differences (developed versus developing) from the World 
Cup to the Olympics. Essentially, the World Cup hosts are more varied in terms of economic variation 
where developing countries in South America are just as probable to host the World Cup as developed 
European or North American countries. The Summer Olympic Games are a little less varied but we see 
smallest variation in hosting nations of the Winter Olympic Games. The Winter Olympic Games are 
mainly hosted by Nordic, prosperous European, or North American countries, most of which are 
characterized with a substantially higher gross domestic product per capita. Matheson stresses that if 
developing countries want to experience more economy growth, they stay away from hosting the games 
where the initial costs are too great to overcome.  
Events end up not being profitable for primarily one of two reasons: early overestimation of 
profits or underestimation of costs. While this may be the ‘classic’ investment theory, this just happens to 
be on a billion-dollar scale. Per the overestimation of revenue streams, both Matheson and Késenne 
(2005) demonstrate that although mega sport events can generate adequate revenue for a cost-benefit 
spreadsheet, the distribution of the money does not automatically favor the host city where a substantial 
portion often falls on the international investors, non-local hospitality and service suppliers, and 
international sporting government bodies.4 A possible positive effect was noted by Qi Gong (2012), from 
the University of Nevada, that building stadiums for the hosting of the Games often create spill-over 
effects. Infrastructure is often built where the land is cheap and impoverished, any presence of money in 
those areas due to the mega sport event would be considered a benefit regardless of how much.5 A 
possible negative is the aforementioned where the local economy often sees less revenue than originally 
estimated from the hosted event and thus the overestimation hurts in budgeting for the future, ultimately 
landing the host in debt. Despite a multitude of documented research that suggests the complexity and 
																																																						
4 Késeenne, S.; European Sports Management Quarterly, 5, 133-142 (2005); Do we need an economic impact study or a cost-benefit analysis of a 
sports event? 
5Gong, Qi.; University of Nevada; The Positive and Negative Economic Contributions of Mega-Sporting Events to Local Communities; 
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2363&context=thesesdissertations 
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profitability, applicant cities often take for granted the disparity in the generated revenues in the short-run 
versus the anticipated long-run revenues generated from trade, upgrading their infrastructure, and 
attracting future corporate investment (local and foreign) into their local economy.  
The second reason why countries become unsuccessful hosts is due to their underestimation of 
investment costs. A majority of these costs are found in the investment in infrastructure in preparation for 
the event: stadiums, media villages, and structures to host the influx of millions of people. Harry Arne 
Solberg and Holger Preuss (2007) analyze the reasoning behind that and conclude that cities spend 
substantial amounts of money rebuilding versus upgrading infrastructure. While this can create welfare-
economic gains (long term implicit benefits), this does not assure that the tangible benefits will exceed the 
costs. With many of these host cities placing a significant part of their revenue on inbound tourism, this 
also creates such a high risk gamble on people. When circumstances allow, events can stimulate tourism 
but this visitor influx is not indicative of a long-term demand curve (of a normal supply demand market) 
outward shift, but rather a short term burst. If producers behave rationally, they will supply the market 
with more goods and the supply curve would shift outward as well to regulate the equilibrium price.  
Indirectly, tourism can improve the host’s ability to capitalize on economies of scale but local residents 
would obtain non-local goods and services, which would disappear over time.  
The largest component of hosting is the short term investment and long term impact in 
infrastructure. A number of factors can inhibit long-term tourism demand but the event’s promotion will 
not consistently be able to draw in the same amount of tourists post-event as during the event. One of the 
few analysis using (publicly available) data sets was created by Anita Mehrotra (2011).The thesis was a 
comparative study on the long run impacts specific to the Olympic Games. The study took into account 
the massive pre-event expenditure on infrastructure and tourism expenditure during the event and 
compared it to the lack-there-of in a non-host city over a twenty-year period. The study ultimately found 
that after the initial spurt in economic activity around the event (at time = 0), the economic progress, in 
terms of gross domestic product (GDP), significantly slowed. In some comparative cases, the GDP 
growth slowed so much that the control country (non-host) ended up surpassing the host country within 
ten years after the event.6 This ultimately led her to conclude that the initial ‘sugar rush’ of hosting a 
mega sport event was not worth it in the end on average. The figure below illustrates the long-term 
comparative study:7  
																																																						
6 Mehrotra, A., Saez, E.; UC Berkeley; To Host or Not to Host? A comparison Study of the Long-Run Impacts of the Olympic Games 
https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/mehrotra_anita.pdf 
7 Mehrotra, A., Saez, E.; UC Berkeley; To Host or Not to Host? A comparison Study of the Long-Run Impacts of the Olympic Games 
https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/mehrotra_anita.pdf	
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There are many theories that can explain why this conclusion may occur: variances in countries 
chosen, elimination of positive outliers (Barcelona, Spain), Dutch disease (a net negative impact on an 
economy that originated from a sharp inflow of foreign currency), or poor allocation of resources. For the 
most part, research would suggest that it is not worth it to host such an event where the intangible benefits 
are nearly impossible to measure and the tangible benefits are surpassed by the cost. Based on the leading 
literature, authors (Victor Matheson, Thomas Miceli, Andrew Zimbalist) would generally conclude that it 
just purely based on revenue streams, it is possible to generate a profit from a structured event such as the 
World Cup due to the sheer size, but highly unlikely to yield a profit from an event such as the Olympic 
Games. Upon attending an economist panel concerning this topic, Victor Matheson and Andrew 
Zimbalist clarified that it is possible for outliers to occur such as Los Angeles ’84 or Barcelona ’92. Mr. 
Matheson dubbed this as the ‘hidden gem theory’ where the city must be characterized with the right 
potential in resources to have a long-term positive effect. When Salt Lake City hosted the Winter 
Olympic Games (’02), their revenue change over the past fifteen years compared to Denver ski slopes 
have increased significantly. In this sense, a city’s potential relies on its ability to change for its future 
economy and its location. For example, Salt Lake City was a growing and well-known ski destination. Its 
hosting of the Games only required the park to invest in park improvements for the future (that would 
have been made anyway) and further boosted its already recognized name. In the case of Atlanta, 
however, it is not an internationally recognized city. Hosting the Olympics would certainly help in the 
Figure	1	
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short term, but the city location and culture is constantly second-rate to Nashville and people naturally 
regress back to the larger well-known cities. If people ask where someone wants to go on vacation, they 
would likely say Salt Lake City for a ski vacation or Los Angeles in the winter. This is where the 
retention of natural tourism differs between cities already developed or considered to be a ‘hidden gem’ 
and cities that are not prime for a breakout on the world stage.8  
The general consensus explains that through econometrics, it nearly impossible to yield positive 
statistically significant results when analyzing data surrounding the Olympics. According to Mr. 
Zimbalist, “hosting the event creates the same short-run economic boost equivalent to borrowing a billion 
dollars and using it to build a hole in the city center.” There would be a billion dollars in short term 
spending, but the city and country would be a billion dollars more in debt than before and have no way to 
turn that into a profit. Hosting a mega-sport event comes down to the incurred costs, as mentioned before. 
At the panel, Mr. Zimbalist stated that the cost-overruns are almost the sole reason why hosting fails. If a 
politician wants to get elected or focus on bring in the Olympics or World Cup, he or she will absolutely 
understate the costs to gain public support. At a minimum, the bidding cost for the World Cup or 
Olympics costs anywhere from $60-$100 million. There are four categories of spending: (i) operations 
budget, which is the cost of operating the event; (ii) permanent sports venues, which include the Olympic 
village, (iii) infrastructure, which will be stressed later; (iv) and security. The aggregate of such categories 
varies between $14.8-$23.1 billion. In conclusion, the investment in these games would spur billions of 
dollars in economic activity, but would not be sustained and would eventually hurt the economy. 
Econometric analysis illustrates this relationship of an unsustainable expenditure pattern where a short-
term economic boost is completely undermined by the long-term downfall, per the Olympic Games. This 
is why it is nearly impossible to yield statistically positive results when examining the impact of the 
Games.  
 
 
 
																																																						
8 Victor Matheson, Andrew Zimbalist, Thomas Miceli; “Olympics Lecture” (University of Connecticut Law, April 12th, 2019.)  
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The differentiation between the Games and the World Cup was examined by Dr. Miceli. He explained 
that due to the spread out nature, size, and duration of the World Cup, the revenue streams will be 
astronomically larger. This is in part why the World Cup hosts experience just made the games longer and 
larger to create more revenue. Another reason that World Cup host experience marginally more success is 
due to the destinations chosen: all places with soccer (fútbol) leagues. This makes the infrastructure costs 
significantly less. Due to the spread out nature of the event, the costs are spread out among different cities 
(sometimes other nations) and the profits created catalyze economic activity in all of the different places 
where the competitions are held; unlike the centralized pattern of the Olympics. Theoretically, it is more 
probable that hosting the World Cup would produce more positive outcomes than hosting either of the 
Olympic Games.  
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Theoretical Model 
 
The literature review suggests there is no general consensus as to whether or not hosting a mega-sport 
event helps or hinders economic growth. One theory supported by several macroeconomists suggests that 
hosting a mega-sport event increases international awareness and thus results in a positive, short-lived, 
economic effect on the output. Conversely, a numerous amount of existing literature indicates the 
opposite: that hosting such an event causes a negative short-term impact on the growth of the economy.  
 
Short-Term Economic Impact:  
 
We will briefly touch on the subject of legacies and implicit benefits/costs to address possible 
reasoning as to why host countries and cities primarily desire to host the event and yet some are unable to 
consistently replicate these results. A legacy is an externality (external phenomenon) that arises in the 
wake of the event which attempts to capture people’s behavior. Some of the positive legacies include: 
urban revival, improved public welfare, reduced unemployment, host city marketing, projection of 
cultural values, and economic signaling that the host is ready to engage in business with the rest of the 
world (if not already). On the other hand, negative legacies include: traffic produced from incoming 
visitors, production of real estate bubble due to raised prices, employment is only temporary, and further 
socioeconomic hierarchical differentiation. Unfortunately, further research would suggest that there is no 
accurate way to accurately measure the impact of the implicit benefits or costs. Two different methods 
have been used in attempt to capture the gravity of the implicit benefits: top down approach and the 
bottom up approach. The top down approach is very controversial where one author stated that “In theory 
one only needs to compare the economic variables of a city/region, which staged the event with the same 
variables of the city/region not staging the event” (Hanusch, 1992).9 This model was found to be 
oversimplified as it assumed many variables were equal between the control and treatment group. The 
bottom up approach attempted to measure the value of the values by measuring the lasting infrastructure 
the investment into the games produced. The approach considered the development of the city between 
the control city versus the treatment (host) city. While both approaches were attempted, both were found 
to be static and unable to truly capture unforeseen elasticities. 
 
 
																																																						
9 Preuss, H.; Johannes Guttenberg-Universitat Mainz, Germany; Lasting Effects of Major Sporting Events; 
https://idrottsforum.org/articles/preuss/preuss061213.pdf  
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While some theories also address the implicit and intangible benefits (country image leading to 
increased tourism) and costs (increase in human traffic and pollution from increased tourism), this section 
will primarily focus on the tangible Gross Domestic Product of a country and equation-driven aspects of 
theoretical macroeconomics. Normally, an economy is determined by either measuring the gross domestic 
product per a given year via the expenditure, income, or value added approach. The theory explained will 
use the expenditure approach which suggests GDP is determined by the equation:  
 
Y = C(Y - T) + G + I(r) + NX(r) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This equation identifies the expenditure approach to measuring the output of an economy (GDP) 
by accruing the total amount of spending in the economy from consumers, government, investment, and 
foreign trades. Consumption (C) is normally the largest GDP component in the economy consisting of 
private (household) expenditures. It is a function of how much income people have subtracted by the 
amount they owe the government in taxes. Investment (I) includes the purchasing of intermediary goods 
that would help create the final goods such as business investment in equipment to produce their final 
good that would appear on store shelves. Government (G) spending is measured as the aggregate if all 
government purchases of final goods and services. It includes salaries of public servants, purchase of 
military weapons, and any foreign expenditure by the government. Next exports (NX) represents the gross 
exports subtracting the total imports. GDP captures the amount a country produces including those from 
foreign nations’ consumption, thus exports are added. Imported goods are deduced to avoid counting the 
foreign supply as domestic. 
 
Nations and cities compete to host international sporting events such as the World Cup and 
Summer and Winter Olympic Games even if large investment costs are incurred. When a city decides to 
undertake a mega sporting event, they do so with the intention that hosting such an event will provide 
many direct financial benefits as well as countless indirect benefits. Since there has been no credible way 
of calculating the intangible benefits a country receives due to hosting a mega sport event, this analysis 
will focus on the theoretical benefits: taxes, income, unemployment, and small project investment and 
how these variables affect the larger economic indicators a country reflects.  
Y= Gross Domestic Product  
C = aggregate consumption expenditure of country’s goods and services 
I = aggregate amount of a country’s investment  
G = aggregate of a country’s government expenditure  
NX = net result of a country’s exports and imports 
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Theoretically, hosting such events as the World Cup would elicit a positive impact on the 
economy provided that the incurred costs are not exorbitantly larger. Usually, the main source of revenue 
is generated by the influx of tourists. This mass attraction of international tourists should cause an 
aggregate increase in the consumption variable (C) in the Keynesian equation. Let us estimate a minimum 
of two million people enter the country for the duration of the event and each spend a minimum $100 per 
jersey of their favorite player (World Cup). Conservatively, tourists will contribute a positive $200 
million in aggregate expenditure (C).  
 
 Hosting a mega sport event would also enact a multitude of chain reactions due to an influx of 
tourism: (i) decrease in unemployment where there would be more employment opportunities for local 
workers; (ii) ultimate increase in government spending; (iii) and in increase in net exports due to pre-
event spending in infrastructure. With more expenditure occurring in the economy, businesses would 
have more resources to pay workers higher wages. This increase in income would allow for either more 
expenditure (increase in C), more savings (more bank lending), and a higher tax rate. A higher tax rate 
means the government has more money to spend on local projects, such as pre-event investing in 
infrastructure. This investment in infrastructure in addition to an increase in aggregate expenditure would 
elicit an increase in Gross Domestic Product (Y) and thus an increase in the overall country interest rate. 
The figure below illustrates the increase in the interest rate due to an aggregate increase in a country’s 
GDP where liquidity demand (L) is a function of Y (GDP).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L’(i,Y)	
i’	
Figure	2	
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As seen in the above figure, an increase in aggregate expenditure elicits an increase in the 
liquidity demand and macro interest rate. This results in an increase a decrease in the exchange rate where 
domestic currency becomes more affordable and desirable to foreign nations. An increase in the foreign 
desire of domestic products indicates a positive sum in net exports. Logically, in influx of tourism should 
elicit a positive aggregate impact on the economy.  
 
Commonly found, however, is that there appears to be a negative impact on host countries for 
several years after the Olympic Games are held. As pointed out in the most current research on the long-
run effects (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002) this negative impact on the host countries may be a result of 
the increase in domestic investment and excitement for hosting the Olympics. This, in turn, would lead to 
an increase in domestic and international demand for host country's products and would most likely be 
seen through the consumption channel of the classic macroeconomic equation for output: 
 
Y = C(Y - T) + G + I(r) + NX(r) 
  
However, this spike in consumption would be relatively short-lived and as public infrastructure 
built for the Games remains unused, negative capacity effects could result in a decline in long-run output. 
Thus though an increase in government spending is expansionary fiscal policy, the spending on the 
Olympic Games may have an even smaller multiplier effect than current research suggests (Ball, 1999).10 
This may partially be attributed to the multiplier working the opposite direction: the non-recurring boost 
to expenditure results in a longer-run fall in demand as the economy returns to its pre-Olympic 
equilibrium income (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002).11 This suggests an explanation for why the impact 
is negative for a long period of time after the Games are hosted. 
 
Another explanation for results in contradiction of basic macroeconomic theory would be a loss 
of local expenditure. One of the largest positive explanations promoting hosting a mega sport event is due 
to the resulting mass of expenditure from tourists and media rights. What is not necessarily considered, 
however, is the investment from transnational organizations or international investors. Money originally 
invested by I.e. Coca Cola, a global organization, will be paid back by the revenues generated from tourist 
expenditures. This money will go to the Coca Cola organization and not necessarily to the local economy. 
Per the 2014 Brazil, Coca Cola invested around $7.6 billion; since the organization reported a return 
																																																						
10	PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002); Business and Economic Benefits of the Sydney 2000 Olympics: A collation of evidence. Sydney 
11 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002); Business and Economic Benefits of the Sydney 2000 Olympics: A collation of evidence. Sydney 
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roughly 5%, therefore an extra $380 million generated revenues would return to the Coca Cola company 
and thus out of the local economy.12 The supplementary part of this theory of generated money leaving 
the economy can be connected through housing. Mega events are frequently characterized by high 
capacity constraints and thus high prices for accommodations and hospitality services. Hotel rooms, 
villas, and village lodges can sell as high as three times the normal rate during a globalized event because 
many people are initially price inelastic. Out of these inflated prices, the desk clerks, valets, cleaning 
staff, and complementary services employees’ wages do not triple. Thus as the tourist industry allows for 
a significant returns to capital for these hospitality conglomerates, the majority of these services are based 
exterior to the local economy and event expenditure leaks of the host economy.   
 
The Impact of Infrastructure Investment:  
 
The empirical section of this thesis will focus on the empirical consequences for long-term 
economic growth with hosting a mega event. As such it is imperative to cover the main reason of how a 
host economy fails or prospers: infrastructure. Infrastructure is the largest form of investment (majority of 
early spending) and government spending with each government’s highest hope of profit attached with it. 
This section will focus on the theoretical direct and implicit effects of infrastructure as a long-term 
venture due to its sheer importance. The investment in infrastructure is both the key to the financial 
success of hosting a mega-sport event and the bridge between the short run costs (pre event) and the long 
term economic progress. The major question is whether or not it is worth it to largely finance a billion-
dollar project for the hope that it will pay off in a decade’s time. The goal of any business investment is 
for it to be financially beneficial to the investor. In economics, the objective is to maximize the total 
amount of profit filling the demand for a product. An investment in infrastructure is a little riskier where 
the investment guarantees a supply of new infrastructure in hopes that the demand will be met by the 
sporting event and in the long term by the normal populace. On this supply side of this equation, a city 
(Olympics) or country (World Cup) needs to be prepared to host millions of new tourists as well as 
accommodate the countries’ sports teams. Precedent illustrates that all hallmark events go through a long 
period of preparation ranging from four to eleven years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
12 Narula, S.; Coca-Cola’s investment in the World Cup didn’t exactly pay off; qz.com; https://qz.com/238538/coca-colas-investment-in-the-
world-cup-didnt-exactly-pay-off/ 	
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The figure above depicts the timeline necessary for the usual amount of time required to be 
prepared for the hosting of the mega sport event.13 Countries and cities often require at least six years to 
adequately host the event. On the other hand, some cities have infrastructure that enables them to stage 
major events with very little need for investment. Consequently, a significantly lower amount of revenue 
generated via ticket sales or media coverage is required; this is where most hosts of mega sport events 
have come close or experienced profitable returns in both the short and long run.  
 
Many investors understand that while infrastructure investments typically do not generate 
economic benefits for another decade, they can create many positives if done correctly. Advocates of 
hosting a mega sporting event claim that stadiums and sports infrastructure can serve as a base element to 
promoting local economic development. It is envisioned that the stadiums and new transportation build in 
tandem would serve as an integrated component of an (often times) gentrifying and diversifying local 
economy. Camp Nou (FC Barcelona Stadium) is an easy representation of advocates’ theory; a stadium 
that has hosted many international events and tournaments. The stadium was built in 1957 and rests in an 
area known as Les Corts, which fifty years ago was a ghetto. This venture posted the highest revenue in 
sports history at $770 million annually and generates a host of spillover effects for the local community as 
millions of fans travel internationally, not necessarily just for the international competition, to watch the 
event. An improved and almost thriving entertainment district has developed around the stadium with 
dozens of eating and drinking establishments within a few blocks. While Camp Nou is an example of a 
thriving measurable economic benefits, advocates also argue that in certain cases, hosting a mega event 
can create significant intangible benefits (novelty effect) for a country, cultural site restoration, and short 
term jobs. Some of these short term, intangible benefits stem from the ‘novelty effect’ where more people 
																																																						
13 Solberg, H.; Preuss, H.; Major Sporting Events and Long-Term Tourism Impacts; 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2425/5462c4984e01c1aa075c1be8ac95f74f172b.pdf  
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come to view the iconic site because it is ‘new or substantially rebranded as new.’ For example, a recent 
study was performed suggesting that a city or country having a UNESCO site would significantly 
improve a city’s annual tourism influx. Per the over-hauling of a once-great or outdated sports 
arena, these restoration projects would theoretically draw more tourists in towards the event area, if not 
for the event. Another argument is that this investment will create short term jobs until completion, for the 
duration of nearly a decade. It would not be a solve to unemployment, but it would certainly decrease the 
rate for the next country census and create a better image for the country. 
 
Long-Term Infrastructure Planning: 
  
Long-term infrastructure investment is dependent upon the amount of existing infrastructure and 
the amount that needs to be built. The equation below indicates that the amount of literature required to be 
built is dependent on the amount of infrastructure a host already possesses. Therefore, if a country already 
possesses a majority of the edifices in a quality required to host the event or support the influx of tourists 
for the event, then the initial investment will be sizably less than those without. 
 
I (I0, In)  
I = I0 + In 
 
This implies that city planners would objectively (mathematically) analyze the cost-benefit of 
refurbishing stadiums and other infrastructure versus new construction of the same. However, many city 
planners do not take this into account. Research shows that many of the investment costs historically 
incurred are attributed to the new construction of stadiums that could have been refurbished or building 
structures in city areas that impede the existing flow of architecture of a city (all primary structures). 
Figure 2 below illustrates an overview of the structures generally required to host such an event: (i) the 
primary structure entails the immediate necessities of the athletes for the performance show, (ii) the 
secondary structure entails the often illustrious Olympic or World Cup Village and all tributary structures 
that athletes require; (iii) the tertiary structure provides for the influx of tourism for the event and 
hopefully in the long term.14 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
14 Solberg, H.; Preuss, H.; Major Sporting Events and Long-Term Tourism Impacts; 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2425/5462c4984e01c1aa075c1be8ac95f74f172b.pdf  
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The primary structure of the event-specific construction is for facilities intended for the use by 
athletes.  This includes the stadiums, required arenas, (indoor and outdoor) and Olympic swimming pools. 
Additional to the stage elements, athletic leisure is also built: locker rooms and spas are considered to be 
an integral a part of these athletic-specific resorts. The successful host cities tend to transform these 
facilities into full time resorts or men’s fitness clubs. This section of infrastructure is the most impactful 
in terms of potential costs or benefits. It is necessary for cities to correctly design, integrate and convert 
these up-front investments into their respective cities’ long-term economic plans. Research illustrates that 
this investment is a ‘double-edged sword’ and could be worth the risk: difficult to execute, expensive, and 
necessary for the event; but if performed correctly, this investment could yield positive long-term 
benefits.  
 
The secondary structure invested in for a mega event is the development of housing: villages for 
athletes, officials, and media representatives. A benefit of this is the resulting gentrification of that part of 
the city, which is often a distinct contrast with the previous economic and lifestyle character of the 
neighborhood. Barcelona, Spain was completely transformed into a tourist city with its creation of a 
beach and its restructuring of the transportation system to fit the new ‘destination city’ style. Other 
examples include Seoul and Atlanta for their prosperous hosting of their Summer Olympic Games. In 
Figure	4	
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addition, the sport parks often created around the city as professional training facilities are typically 
converted in the future to recreational fields or resorts. All of these types of investments anchor future 
ways for a city to generate long term money from its initial investment into the mega sport event. 	
 
The tertiary structure covers all supplementary elements to stage the events: classified herein as  
destination city tourism structures. This includes hospitality investments in the form of hotels, new public 
transportation from the airport or train station, and restaurants/bars/clubs that promote lively nightlife. To 
create destination city structure, further labor is required, which will temporarily allow for the creation of 
more jobs. Not every host city invests in a tertiary/destination city structure; yet, most cities have yielded 
a long term benefit in their local economies. Theoretically correlated, the tertiary structure, if built 
correctly, becomes the building base for rebranding and anchoring the new destination city the mega sport 
event. The immediate peak demand (tourism, attendance, media attention, etc.) that accompanies such 
events exceeds the capacity in almost every host city (Essex & Chalkley, 1999),15 and as such it is 
imperative that every host city is ready to take in the demand of new tourists or they will lose probably 
revenue. 
When playing the long game, politicians must consider and account for the current infrastructure 
the city possesses. A city should consider three areas of its development plan when organizing a major 
event: (i) the city development that is necessary irrespective of the sport event, (ii) the infrastructure 
required for the sport event that is planned anyway for the general development of the city, and (iii) the 
infrastructure that is needed for the event that is not yet included in the city’s long-term plan.16 There is a 
possibility that this third aspect can be so expensive, if In = 0, further development of the rest (planned 
development that is not related to the event) slows down. One must take into consideration whether event- 
specific development exceeds the long-term demand from locals and visitors. A city of 150,000 residents, 
for example, does not need a stadium with capacity for 80,000 spectators. It may not be able to host as 
many international tourists at a specific venue but in the long run, there may not be as many empty seats 
from unsold tickets; thus the initial cost would be minimized. Cities that regard major sport events as 
instruments to improve their attractiveness as tourist destinations should consider all three areas of their 
city-development plans before bidding for or creating events. This normally would entail taking structural 
inventory and then determining the future direction of the city or country: if the host should change 
economic strategies as Barcelona did (towards Tourism), use this event as an excuse to build more 
sporting stadiums for their host teams as Brazil did, or if the host will simply use it as an excuse to branch 
																																																						
15	Essex,	S.;	Chalkley,	B.,	Leisure	Studies,	17,	187-207	(1999);	Olympic	Games:	Catalyst	of	Urban	Change	
16 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2425/5462c4984e01c1aa075c1be8ac95f74f172b.pdf 
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their country/city image to the world. Most successful case occur when cities use mega-events and their 
investments as a catalyst for a full-scale change; whereas countries that justify hosting the event and its 
costs solely to leverage or alter the host image with means to attract ‘other people’s money’ and not help 
the city build new infrastructure in anticipation of creating a new destination city, have failed to achieve 
the sough after, long-term sustained economic benefits.  
An alternative argument that has been recurrently made is that infrastructure not only entails 
stadiums, but also freeways and train systems. This is considered a large scale hard-infrastructure change 
where the whole city landscape can be adapted to the its future. While most cities seem to falter in this 
area, an example of profit comes from Barcelona’s hosting of the 1992 Summer Olympics. The regional 
commissioner of Catalunya decided to completely redo Barcelona’s train system, city layout, and beach 
sites in effort to brand Barcelona as a tourist city. This is one of the few examples in history of long term 
economic prosperity from a massive change to infrastructure, but it shows that hosting a mega event 
allows for a large scale investment or reinvention of a city in effort for its betterment. Another instance 
exemplifies Japan and its use of their upcoming bid for the 2002 FIFA World Cup as an opportunity to 
expand upon their initial investment in a technologically advanced subway system. Many people express 
their train system today is still one of the best innovations and train systems the world has to offer. While 
Japan’s economy and demographics struggles in many other ways, technological advancement and 
implementation into their city foundations is not one of those.  
Long-term investment structure is one of the large make-or-break points when preparing to host a 
mega sport event. Conventional economic theory suggests that the increase in spending via the 
government, consumers, and private investment would increase short run gross domestic products. In fact, 
many large sporting events do often generate revenues that cover the operational costs of the event, but 
not the full investment costs. Despite a large spurt of spending, what the expenditure approach does not 
indicate, is the big crater of debt this mass-spending creates (per the investment in infrastructure). This 
can create negative long run effects by reducing other activities that require tax funding. The 2002 Athens 
Summer Olympics, which left the city with enormous financial debt, is a well-known example of this 
phenomenon. In general, public and private investment often share the burden of financing the 
investments but with hefty interest percentage (cost of debt) placed on the returns. Government revenue 
needed to pay these interest rates and re-pay principal amounts depends on government returns from the 
initial investment into hosting the event and a higher collection of taxes generated, ironically, by the 
expected growth in the local economy generated by the event. It is a higher interdependent circle where if 
the investment is not mapped and carried out correctly, a billion-dollar investment goes to waste (does not 
generate any return that would go back into the positive-feedback-looped economy). Taxes can also be an 
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independent variable. Whether or not the additional revenue generated by the event or the creation of new 
jobs makes its way to citizens’ pockets (because of their new wages can be taxed) is not necessarily felt 
by the local individual or health of the city.  
 
Long-Term Theoretical Economic Impact: 
 
The long run goal of hosting a mega-sport event will be to sustain the theoretical economic 
benefit (from spending in the short run) and capitalizing on the investments made on infrastructure and 
transportation. The previous few pages have covered the importance of infrastructure investment in the 
short and long run. This subsequent section will focus on economic theories that relate to the empirical 
conclusions of this paper: Dutch disease, three forms of overspending and the crowding out effect, and 
population growth rate as it affects GDP per capita. These theories often examine phenomena that are not 
taken into account when correlating data empirically and thus it is important to introduce these so they 
can be addressed as explanations for specific data patterns. The empirical section of this paper will aim to 
illustrate how hosting a mega event would help or hurt a city/country measured against an averaged 
timeline of gross domestic product per capita growth.  
 
Dutch disease is a theory that encompasses the idea of a quick unsustainable surge in economic 
spending. Initially, Dutch disease was first developed in the 1960s when the discovery of Natural gas 
generated a sharp inflow of currency. This quick inflow of currency lead to very high currency 
appreciation, which made the country’s other products less price competitive in the forex market. In this 
case, a short run tourism spike as well as foreign investment are natural occurrences when hosting a mega 
sport event. This sharp increase in expenditure is, in most cases, unsustainable after hosting the event and 
ends up hurting the rest of the export products for the host country. Analogous to a sugar high, the body 
feels amazing for a short amount of time until the sugar is completely processed. At the end of the spike, 
the body regresses to feeling sluggish and takes a few hours to produce the necessary amount of 
endorphins to make a person feel ‘normal’ again. This empirical section of this paper will be essentially 
testing this theory: after the initial spike, a natural downturn in exports will occur due to appreciate 
currency. Is there a correlation in certain characteristics that allow for certain countries to recover from 
this natural downturn and perform better in the long run?  
 
The crowding out effect will be measured in three aspects: one with regards to the displacement 
of routine tourists; the second with regards to an overestimation of the purchasing of tourism products; 
and the third with regards to overshadowing large government spending. The late half of (Northern 
	 25	
	
Hemisphere) spring and summer are the natural traveling periods for most tourists around the world. 
Europe is habitually visited when a down-jacket is maximum layer required and South America is more 
frequently visited when the temperature is less than 100 degrees. Normally, Europe receives around 670 
million tourists per year with nearly 60% during those time periods and South America also receives 
roughly 60% of their 100 million of their annual tourists during those seasons as well. With the exception 
of the winter Olympic Games, the Summer Olympics and World Cup normally happen during those 
months of frequent international travel. Michael Overmyer authored a thesis about the displacement of 
tourists from the London 2012 Olympic Games opinionating that London might have actually been better 
off had it not hosted the event.17 A city’s hotels and restaurants are often at capacity with sports fans, and 
had those same hotel rooms and restaurants been full of business executives or routine vacationers, the 
tournament may not have resulted in a short-run net increase in economic activity. His article indicates 
the primary idealism of the crowding out effect where the influx of tourists caused a less-than-expected 
number of tourists the year the Olympics occurred. Pre-tournament tourism predictions were clearly 
overstated as seasonal vacationers cannot be considered if they are displaced. Mr. Overmyer also noted 
that this displacement of tourists during the event effected the number of routine tourists a year post-
event. Tourists who believe the host city will be too crowded look for other places to vacation and thus 
the following when the tournament effects become minimal, the host would actually lose cyclic tourists.   
 
The second illustration of the crowding out effect come due to an excessive amount of spending 
on tourism products. Naturally, as a demand for a product increases or the supply of the product 
decreases, its price will decrease incentivizing consumers to purchase less. There are a couple possibilities 
as to why this occurs during a mega sports event: a monopolized market for tourism products and a fixed 
supply of products. As visitors influx into the host economy, the sellers can essentially charge an 
exorbitant price they desire. Tourists, many traveling internationally, are likely to still buy the 
memorabilia offered at the event making tourism products a slightly more inelastic good in the beginning. 
On the other hand, however, local demand of the memorabilia will likely be displaced by the tourists 
purchases. The other possibility is that the host economy vendors have a select supply of goods and thus 
as the supply decreases with each purchase, the price of such products increases. For this example, it will 
be assumed that there not a fixed supply of tourist products. Figure 5 below illustrates the crowding out 
effect’s impact on the demand for tourism products and thus the resulting long term consequences as 
more expenditure occurs.  
 
 
																																																						
17 Overmyer, M.; Grand Valley State University; Economic Impact Analysis on Olympic Host-Cities; 
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honorsprojects  
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The figure above illustrates the long term potential changes in demand and supply to tourism 
products due to a country’s hosting of an event.18 In this figure, tourism products are represented as a 
single market commodity. D0 is the initial downward sloping demand curve and S0 is the initial upward 
sloping supply curve. Another simplification, we assume that the D0 curve only includes local residents 
and the S0 curve only consists of local producers. Point (P0, Q0) represents the initial market equilibrium 
where P0 is the equilibrium price and Q0 is the initial equilibrium quantity. Consumer incentive to buy can 
be captured by the area P0eh and producer surplus can be represented by the area P0ae.  
 
Hosting a mega sport event causes an outward shift in the demand curve due to arrival of tourists. 
This shift brings the new equilibrium to the point (P1, Q1). A shift in the demand curve lessens the 
incentive to consumers to purchase tourist products as the price increases (area P1jg). This change in the 
consumer surplus affects both residential and tourist expenditures. Just as locals would be less 
																																																						
18 Solberg, H.; Preuss, H.; Major Sporting Events and Long-Term Tourism Impacts; 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2425/5462c4984e01c1aa075c1be8ac95f74f172b.pdf  
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incentivized to purchase high priced items, purchases by regularly-travelled tourists would likely be 
displaced due to the increase in price.  
 
As the price increases, the producer incentive to keep supplying products into the market decreases. This 
can only be remedied by attracting more tourists with a higher willingness to pay (who are price inelastic) 
than those being displaced. Depending on the place, the event may attract more than leisure vacationers 
such as business executives or convention delegates, who commonly spend more than the average 
vacationer (Solberg, Andersson, Shibli, 2001).19 If the venue fails to attract these types of consumers with 
deeper pockets, then fewer commodities will be purchased.  
 
The subsequent shift in the tourism product market is an outward shift in the supply curve from 
S0 to S1. As producers see the influx of tourists purchasing goods, they become more optimistic and 
supply more product to match the demand of the consumers. This positive shift in the supply curve will 
lower the price equilibrium price and increase the quantity of goods bought to the new equilibrium (P2, 
Q2). The supply curve needs to be shifted such that the new price is equal to the initial price (P0) to 
simplify the progressing theory. This shift hypothetically compensates for the crowding-out effect from 
the previous demand curve shift. Despite the initial simplification of having the demand curve only apply 
to local consumers, this would likely not be the case. In reality, the initial demand curve, D0, would 
contain tourists where producers would only logically only supply more goods with the confidence that 
the products will be bought by incoming consumers. The consumer surplus has increased to the area of 
P2di, but the aggregate consumer surplus will have increased to the original level. The price reduction 
increases the quantity of goods traded but lessens the amount of revenue generated per item exchanged.  
 
The final stage of the long term analysis in the displacement of tourism product expenditure is the 
final inward shift in demand. Long term assumes that the event has passed and tourism is fading out 
significantly. While it can be assumed that a lack of tourists would allow for local residents, the test 
subject in the displayed model, to purchase more goods, the ultimate lack in promotion (of the product) 
and ‘buzz’ surrounding the event would have died out leaving the products less desirable. Realistically, 
the initial demand curve, D0, would have included tourists, thus as tourists leave the host country, there 
will be a heavy decrease in the amount of consumers. The demand curve is allowed to shift back to the 
starting position D0=D2 to simplify the theory. This implies and important assumption that there are no 
																																																						
19 Solberg, H.; Preuss, H.; Major Sporting Events and Long-Term Tourism Impacts; 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2425/5462c4984e01c1aa075c1be8ac95f74f172b.pdf  
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legacies, implicit externalities, surrounding the event. To be clear, legacies are an important part to a host 
country, but are nearly impossible to calculate and are not implemented into this theoretical model.  
 
The third illustration of the crowding out effect: an alternate direction of expenditure where the 
government could have invested its billions of currency on other city projects instead of on the specific 
event. Logically, the initial increase in GDP, income, and thus raised taxes would allow for a larger 
government budget. If the government had decided to not to invest in event infrastructure, but rather 
natural infrastructure (i.e. freeways) or improving other means of transportation. Without the event, the 
government would have spent money on numerous other projects, which theoretically would have still 
improved the aggregate gross domestic product of the country. Who’s to say this would not have been the 
more efficient and beneficial option? Hypothetically had the event not occurred, London could have spent 
the billions of investment money on other pressing projects. 
  
	 29	
	
Connection to the Empirical Model:  
 
Theory would naturally suggest that a host of such an event as the World Cup, Summer 
Olympics, or Winter Olympics would incur a positive short term boost in the country’s gross domestic 
product per capita due to excessive spending (C), Investment (I), Government spending (G), and a 
positive change in New Exports (NX). Not taking into account any legacy, externalities, or implicit 
benefits, the following figure (Figure 6) illustrates what is generally hypothesized from the data gathered 
from each of the events. It is hypothesized that the host country will incur a short-run boost in economic 
activity surrounding the time of the event.  
 
 
 
 
 
  Macroeconomic theory would suggest that, holding the total population of a country constant, the 
host economy would experience a short-term boost due to expected increases in aggregate consumption 
and government spending. As tourism dissipates, this expected boost is suggested to leave with it and 
would thusly cause an overall decreasing of the GDPPC growth rate. The empirical portion of this paper 
will test (with data from the World Bank) the validity of the theory.  
 
 
 
Figure	6	
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This model will make a parallel trends assumption which insinuates that the difference between 
the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ group will remain constant over time. The figure above illustrates the initial 
difference as zero but will be represented by an interactive variable, which will be explained further in the 
next section. It is hypothesized that at Time = 0, the short term tangible benefits will come into full effect 
within a year and shift the intercept and slope the GDPPC of the host country by the start of a year after 
the event (Time = 1). One factor that is not accurately displayed in the graph above is that it is expected 
that the slope of the GDPPC curve will eventually begin to level out (similar to that of a Solow growth 
output curve) versus keeping its new steep shape (from the Time = 1 ‘jump’). On the other hand, it is 
expected that the non-host country GDPPC will neither change in slope or intercept as it has not 
undertaken or invested in any substantial event that would allow for a drastic change in its GDPPC. The 
aforementioned hypothesis will be tested with data from a twenty year (long run) period per event in 
attempt to answer the question of whether or not it is worth it to host a mega sport event. 
 
 
 
 
  
*Note: that the theoretical model and empirical are separate entities. The theoretical model speculates what should happen in the 
short run, according to economic theory, if a country decided to host a mega sport event. The empirical model will test the validity 
of the macroeconomic theory against the data in the short and long run where the effects of such can also be seen by the β5 and β6 
variables. * 
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Data Set:   
 
In order to determine the positive or negative impact on host countries’ gross domestic product 
per capita levels, data was obtained from the World Bank. World Bank data was used for the sole reason 
that it was the platform that had the largest amount of consistent data. Other data platforms charged fees, 
or had very incomplete data sets with ten to twenty year gaps. The World Bank data was not perfect and 
other sources (Statista and FED) were sought out to complete the remaining gaps. The fully constructed 
data set of this thesis is comprised of three separate subsidiary data sets of all mega-sport tournaments 
(World Cup, Summer Olympics, and Winter Olympics) from 1960 until present date. Each data set is 
comprised of the annual gross domestic product per country of the host and runner-up countries. The first 
data set consists of the annual macro data surrounding the World Cup hosts and runner-up countries from 
the bidding process. The second data set consists of the annual macro data surrounding the Summer 
Olympic hosts and runner-up countries. The third data set consists of the annual macro data surrounding 
the Winter Olympics hosts and runner-up countries. 
 
The empirical section of this thesis will be used to test the validity of the suggested outcome 
theorized from basic macroeconomic influences and determine if host countries, on average, perform 
better/reach higher economic standing in the long-run. The dependent variable used to judge the impact 
on the host country is the gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) to capture the macroeconomic 
standing of a country incorporating its population. Time will also be accounted for in this model in two 
respects: (i) a normal progression to account for GDP’s natural correlation over time; and (ii) to account 
for four major events that severely affected the world economy. A set of binary variables will be used to 
simplify the effect of a country hosting versus not hosting an event where the host retains a ‘1 value’ and 
a non-host retains a ‘0 value.’ A set of interactive independent variables will be generated from 
multiplying the dummy variables with Time to create the necessary distinction of a difference-in-
difference model. This will be explained further in the next section. The final component of the data is a 
set of macro-variable controls such as a country’s population, interest, and inflation rate. Originally, a few 
more control variables were to be used but the downside is that as these variables trend over time, they 
would mitigate the visual effects of the binary and interactive independent variables. The Parallel Trends 
assumption is already implicit, thus only a select few number of controls will be used in the empirical 
regressions. In other words, a fairly large assumption of the data will already be made to capture all the 
differences in the data (from the interactive variable) versus having the controls overshadow the answer to 
the question.   
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The empirical section of this thesis will utilize a difference-in-difference (DID) model. It is a 
quasi-experimental technique that uses longitudinal data (against time) from treatment versus control 
groups to obtain an appropriate counterfactual and measure a casual effect.20 The basic idea is to compare 
the treatment group and the control group before and after the stimulus. In this model, the treatment group 
are all the host cities and countries of either an Olympic Games or World Cup and the control group are 
the runner-up cities that were unable to host the event. Should it be found that the runner-up hosted the 
event later on, the runner-up was replaced with another (runner-up) country that displayed a similar 
GDPPC growth rate as the host country.  
 
In order to estimate any casual effect from a sudden stimulus, three assumptions must hold: 
exchangeability, positivity, and a Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption. In this model a fourth 
assumption must also hold: Parallel Trends in outcome. This assumption ensures internal validity of the 
difference-in-difference model where it requires that the difference between the ‘treatment’ and control 
group is constant over time. It is imperative that this assumption hold such that violation of the 
assumption would lead to a biased estimation of the casual effect. 
  
																																																						
20 Pinschke, J.; University of Columbia; Difference-in-Difference Estimation; https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-
methods/difference-difference-estimation  
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Variable List 
Dependent Variable: 
GDPPC: (Gross domestic product per capita) A measure of a country's economic output accounting for 
its number of people 
 
Independent Variables:  
Time: 
Time: progression of years from t=0 per the year 1960.  
Time2, Time3, Time4: 1st-4th degree polynomials in time.  
Event_year: accounts for years preceding and post event. 
Event_timeline: timeline established of 10 years before the event to 10 years post event.  
Host_announced: whether or not a country will host the event activated when host country is announced 
to the host and public. Captures the amount of prep time a host has prior to the event. 1=country selected 
to host, 0=not selected.  
 
Binary Comparisons: 
Host_wc: whether or not a country hosts a World Cup Event. 1= host, 0 = not host 
Host_wc: whether or not a country hosts the Summer Olympic Games. 1= host, 0 = not host 
Host_wo: whether or not a country hosts the Winter Olympic Games. 1= host, 0 = not host 
Post_wc: whether or not a country successfully hosts the event. Accounts for difference in intercept for 
non-hosts. 1= host, 0 = not host 
Post_so: whether or not a country successfully hosts the event. Accounts for difference in intercept for 
Summer Olympics non-hosts. 1= host, 0 = not host 
Post_wo: whether or not a country successfully hosts the event. Accounts for difference in intercept for 
Winter Olympics non-hosts. 1= host, 0 = not host 
 
Interactive Variables:  
Time_Post_wc: Captures the Pre-Post time trend difference for the non-hosts of the World Cup.  
Time_Post_so: Captures the Pre-Post time trend difference for the non-hosts of the Summer Olympics. 
Time_Post_wo: Captures the Pre-Post time trend difference for the non-hosts of the Winter Olympics.  
Time_host_post_wc: Captures the difference of the change (diff in diff) in World Cup host GDPPC 
compared to non-host GDPPC over time.  
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Time_host_post_so: Captures the difference of the change (diff in diff) in Summer Olympics host 
GDPPC compared to non-host GDPPC over time. 
Time_host_post_wo: Captures the difference of the change (diff in diff) in Winter Olympics host 
GDPPC compared to non-host GDPPC over time. 
Host_post_wc: Captures intercept difference in GDPPC ‘jump’ over one year between World Cup hosts 
versus non-hosts.    
Host_post_so: Captures intercept difference in GDPPC ‘jump’ over one year between Summer Olympics 
hosts versus non-hosts.    
Host_post_wo: Captures intercept difference in GDPPC ‘jump’ over one year between Winter Olympics 
hosts versus non-hosts.    
 
*Did not interact Host_time where the interaction that would represent the difference in time trend for hosts and non-hosts prior to the 
event. Not including it shows parallel trends assumption and allows for diff in diff approach.  
 
Controls: 
Total_Population: Total population of a country. 
Gov_spending_gdp_ratio: fractional amount of government expenditure compared to a country’s gross 
domestic product. 
Real_interst_rate: aggregate rate of a proportion of a loan charged as interest to the borrower adjusted 
for inflation. 
Inflation_rate: is the percent growth in the price levels from the previous year.  
Broad_money_billions: the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those of the 
central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the 
central government; bank and traveler’s checks; and other securities such as certificates of deposit and 
commercial paper. 
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Difference-in-Difference Model 
 
Table 1: 
 Treatment Group Control Group 
Pre-Stimulus Treatment*pre Control*pre 
Post-Stimulus Treatment*post Control*post 
 
Intuitively, a difference-in-difference is a comparison of four cell-level means where only once cell is 
treated per regression.21 When this occurs, it can be simplified to the [treatment*post-stimulus], which is 
essentially an interactive independent variable in a simple OLS regression. A typical regression of this 
model should be shown as followed at the minimum:  
 
Yi,t = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Post_Stimulus] + β3[Host*Post_Stimulus] + β4*[Control] + εt 
 
Where: 
Post_Stimulus is an indicator = 1 when t=0 
B3 is the coefficient of interest (the treatment effect) 
Time is the time trend 
Control are various independent bases  
εt is the random error term  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
21 Jagielka, P., Ozier, O.; University of Maryland, College Park; Applied Econometrics: Difference-in-Difference Estimation; 
http://economics.ozier.com/econ626/lec/econ626lecture3_handout.pdf 	
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To allow for the differences in intercepts and time trends, this method has been adapted to create a triple 
interaction between the independent variables where Time and whether or not a country hosted the event 
have to be taken into account. This thesis-specific regression is as shown without controls:  
 
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] + 
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + εt 
Where: 
 
 
*Did not interact Host_time where the interaction that would represent the difference in time trend for hosts and non-hosts prior to the 
event. Not including it shows parallel trends assumption and allows for diff in diff approach. 
 
Thesis-specific regression with controls:  
 
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] + 
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + β7[Total_population] + β8[Inflation_rate] + εt 
Where: 
Total_population is the country initial population at the time of the event 
Inflation-rate is the country inflation rate at the time of the event  
 
 
 
 
 
GDPPCt = gross domestic product per capita per country  
Host is binary for hosting an event 
Time is an annual progression from t =0 to t = 64 
Time2, Time3, and Time4 are fourth degree polynomial terms in the time trend to account for 
possible changes to the GDPPC slope 
Post is binary hosting an event and accounts for extra event stimulus    
Time*Post is the primary difference between hosts v. non-hosts  
Time*Host*Post is the difference in pre-post time trend differences for hosts and non-hosts 
Post*Host is the primary change in GDPPC slopes 
εt is the random error term  
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Gross domestic product per capita has often been thought to be a better indicator of the 
development of an economy as it takes into account in the population versus just an aggregate of total 
goods bought and sold. Often times, a country’s gross domestic product can be due to size of the country. 
The total population (at the time of the event) allows for the control of the initial state of the economy to 
ensure a better estimation of tourism effects. The inflation rate was also included as a key control to 
account for the purchasing power in the host country’s economy. The inclusion of the total population and 
inflation improved the R2 (linear indicator) value but, as predicted, made most of the interactive variable 
coefficients insignificant. This may be due to increased multicollinearity, but further research would 
suggest that the inclusion of these controls simply overshadowed the impact of the interactive variables of 
interest. This is partially why more macro-variable controls were not included. Since GDP trends over 
time (serial correlation is almost certain) with these macro-variable controls, it was likely that these 
controls would improve the linear significance but would mitigate the diff-in-diff effects.  
 
The regressions were created to illustrate the full impact of hosting a mega-sport event. The 
βHost variable is a summation of the βPost and βPost*Host variables where βPost and βPost*Host 
indicate the difference between hosting and not hosting the event. When ‘time’ is factored in, then this 
allows for the calculation of GDP per capita growth where the summation of βTime*Post and 
βTime*Host*Post are equal to the aggregate effect on the long-term growth GDP per capita growth rate. 
Theory would indicate that the overall effect should be positive, but literature would indicate otherwise. 
The manufactured regressions were set up to indicate what parts of the ‘full impact’ cause the difference 
between what theory suggests than what literature concludes.  
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Methodology 
 
The theory previously stated suggests that a positive relationship should occur between GDPPC 
and hosting a mega-sport event. Referring to previous research, however, long-run graphs showing ten 
years before and after the mega-sport events were hosted illustrate that runner-up countries fared better 
than the host countries of the Olympics (Figure 1).  
 
Subsequently, regressions were run to test the theory. Since there were three events, the 
regressions were run individually to ensure a better estimation of the effect of hosting the individual 
events. This also allows for an easier analysis of the effect on a country’s GDP per capita of each event. 
For each of the three events, two regressions were performed: one without controls to measure the full 
consequence of hosting the event and the other with controls. These regressions were as follows:  
 
OLS1: World Cup no controls 
 
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host_wc] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post_wc] 
+ β4[Time*Post_wc] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wc] + β6[Post*Host_wc] + εt 
 
OLS2: World Cup no controls 
 
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host_wc] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post_wc] 
+ β4[Time*Post_wc] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wc] + β6[Post*Host_wc] + β7[Total_population] + 
β8[Inflation_rate] + εt 
OLS3: Summer Olympics no controls 
 
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host_so] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post_so] 
+ β4[Time*Post_so] + β5[Time*Host*Post_so] + β6[Post*Host_so] + εt 
 
OLS4: Summer Olympics with controls 
 
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host_so] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post_so] 
+ β4[Time*Post_so] + β5[Time*Host*Post_so] + β6[Post*Host_so] + β7[Total_population] + 
β8[Inflation_rate] + εt 
OLS5: Winter Olympics no controls 
 
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host_wo] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post_wo] 
+ β4[Time*Post_wo] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wo] + β6[Post*Host_wo] + εt 
 
 
 
OLS6: Winter Olympics with controls 
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host_wo] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post_wo] 
+ β4[Time*Post_wo] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wo] + β6[Post*Host_wo] + β7[Total_population] + 
β8[Inflation_rate] + εt 
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After the results were obtained, several tests were conducted to examine the possible extent of 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and serial correlation. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the spread of 
the error term, GDPPC, is related to the values of an independent variable. In other words, the variance of 
the error term (at the end of the regression equation) is changing, which alters the significance of the 
results and hypothesis testing. Multicollinearity is problematic because it increases the chance of 
identifying a relevant variable as insignificant within the model. It is likely that this model will have some 
multicollinearity since many of the control variables may trend over time. Gross domestic product is a 
macroeconomic variable that depends on its value from the previous period; therefore, the data will likely 
exhibit serial correlation. Since no variables can be omitted without unsatisfying the basic necessities of 
performing a standard difference-in-difference OLS regression, the final model can only be corrected for 
the aforementioned variations of econometric assumptions. The only independent variables that will be 
omitted from the final model are the control variables, total population and inflation rate, to capture the 
full possible impact of a country hosting a mage-sport event.  
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Results: 
i. Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Descriptive statistics provide insight into the sample used in the study. The mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation (CV%) all reveal some different 
aspects of variables in the sample. The statistics for each of the events with and without controls are 
displayed below: Tables 2-5. 
The coefficient of variation (CV%) represents the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean and 
is used when comparing the degree of variation from one data series to another. Since the increased 
spread decreases the standard error of the coefficient, an independent variable with a high CV% value 
will have a decreased standard error and a higher t-statistic. Thus, the CV% value can be used to predict 
whether or not a variable may be significant when included in the model. Although none of the variables 
will be removed from the model, apart from the controls, these significant suggestions can be concluded 
in further analysis and discussion of the final-adjusted model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF 
STATISTSICS: WORLD CUP  
        
  Mean  
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev. 
CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 9953.595 4596.88 48603.48 341.5928 11617.22 117% 4857354 6.57E+10 
TIME 31.68443 33 57 0 14.13759 45% 15462 97337.4 
HOST_WC 0.526639 1 1 0 0.499802 95% 257 121.6537 
POST_WC 0.522541 1 1 0 0.500004 96% 255 121.752 
TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF 
STATISTSICS: WORLD CUP 
WITH CONTROLS 
        
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 10797.03 5617.742 48603.48 341.5928 12058.07 112% 4653520 6.25E+10 
TIME 32.79814 34 57 0 13.61236 42% 14136 79677.44 
HOST_WC 0.545244 1 1 0 0.498527 91% 235 106.8677 
POST_WC 0.522042 1 1 0 0.500094 96% 225 107.5406 
EVENT_TIMELINE -0.06033 0 10 -10 5.935003  -26 15146.43 
GDPPC_BASE 8875.49 2982 48603.48 341.5928 12935.14 146% 3825336 7.19E+10 
TOTAL_POPULATION 75173651 56797087 2.93E+08 22037610 56794476 76% 3.24E+10 1.39E+18 
INFLATION_RATE 12.79106 5.017158 874.2457 -1.352837 48.05608 376% 5512.946 993036.3 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF 
STATISTSICS: WORLD CUP 
        
  Mean  Median  
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 23691.32 22061.16 60283.25 828.5805 13955.76 59% 7675987 6.29E+10 
TIME 37.19753 37.5 57 14 10.36118 28% 12052 34675.36 
HOST_SO 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.500773 100% 162 81 
POST_SO 0.506173 1 1 0 0.500735 99% 164 80.98765 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF 
STATISTSICS: SUMMER 
OLYMPICS WITH 
CONTROLS 
        
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 20317.79 20087.54 51936.89 1398.479 11035.55 54% 4266735 2.55E+10 
TIME 32 32 50 14 8.306336 26% 6720 14420 
HOST_SO 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.501195 100% 105 52.5 
POST_SO 0.52381 1 1 0 0.500626 96% 110 52.38095 
EVENT_TIMELINE 0 0 10 -10 6.06977  0 7700 
GDPPC_BASE 10920.78 9646.252 19115.05 1398.479 6122.532 56% 2293365 7.83E+09 
TOTAL_POPULATION 93231492 57482591 2.98E+08 17065100 84811355 91% 1.96E+10 1.50E+18 
INFLATION_RATE 4.398682 3.127596 28.69759 -0.12790 3.869783 88% 923.7231 3129.82 
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF 
STATISTSICS: WINTER 
OLYMPICS 
        
  Mean  Median  
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 21284.31 20670.82 57579.5 1148.494 13800.32 65% 6853548 6.11E+10 
TIME 31.13354 31 54 8 10.23086 33% 10025 33599.26 
HOST_WO 0.521739 1 1 0 0.500305 96% 168 80.34783 
POST_WO 0.546584 1 1 0 0.4986 91% 176 79.80124 
TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF 
STATISTSICS: WINTER 
OLYMPICS WITH CONTROLS 
        
  Mean  Median  Maximum  
Minimum 
 Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 22028.39 21427.26 57579.5 1148.494 13525.51 61% 6828801 5.65E+10 
TIME 31.46774 31 54 8 10.27694 33% 9755 32635.18 
HOST_WO 0.541935 1 1 0 0.499044 92% 168 76.95484 
POST_WO 0.548387 1 1 0 0.498458 91% 170 76.77419 
EVENT_TIMELINE 0.332258 1 10 -10 6.100766  103 11500.78 
GDPPC_BASE 12002 10587.29 25646.7 2238.803 8037.756 67% 3720620 2.00E+10 
TOTAL_POPULATION 66954272 24746500 2.88E+08 3985258 84852574 127% 2.08E+10 2.22E+18 
INFLATION_RATE 8.916902 2.940634 338.4491 -13.70632 35.57829 399% 2764.24 391136.7 
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Two types of regressions were run for each of the three types of events. In general, the summary 
of statistics would indicate a minimal difference between the aggregated values. The difference in the 
means seem to be +/- a standard deviation and the CV-percentage change seems to only vary about five 
percent. The negative change in the coefficient of variation-percentage is indicative that the inclusion of 
the control variables allow for a more precise estimate of the coefficients where a lessened CV percentage 
means that the data is more centered around the regressed expected value (line). This, however would 
only further the theory that the inclusion of the control independent variables would only mitigate the 
visual effects (in the data) of the stimulus (event) effect. The inclusion of the control variables centers the 
data but since these controls move linearly (across time) with GDPPC, it only mitigates the impact of 
hosting a mega-sport event.  
 
A comparison of the summary of statistics (Tables 2-3) of the first regression (World Cup) 
exhibits a wide variation in the gross domestic product per capita between both hosts and runner up 
countries: a minimum value of $341.59 and a maximum value of $48603.48, and an average of 
$10797.03.  It is important to mention that these two (hosts and runner-ups) should be able to be 
compared because of the parallel trends assumption where the difference in GDPPC slope and intercept 
should be mitigated. Concerning the hosts of the World Cup, there is large variation in this number across 
the countries where the CV is 117% without controls and 112% with controls. With that said, the 
GDPPC_BASE, the gross domestic product per capita at the beginning of the twenty-year period has a 
lower GDPPC with a higher CV. One theory driving the difference between the averaged GDPPC and the 
averaged base year of GDPPC is overall, the taking on of the bidding process and hosting of the World 
Cup not only raised the GDPPC higher than normal inflation would have, but also brought some of the 
developing countries closer in GDPPC to being developed. The variance in the CV narrows from the 
averaged base year towards the averaged GDPPC, which suggests that countries’ GDPPC are slowly 
starting to converge despite only half hosting the World Cup.  
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A comparison of the summary of statistics (Tables 4-5) of the second regression (Summer 
Olympics) displays a wide variation in the gross domestic product per capita: a minimum value of 
$828.58, a maximum value of $60283.25, and an average of $22061.16. Concerning the hosts of the 
Summer Olympics, there is a significantly lessened variation in this number across the countries where 
the CV is 59% without controls and 54% with controls. Although both of these values are considered as 
not-reasonably high, the still indicate that there is a realistic amount of variation in the data but a 
significantly lessened amount than the World Cup. This could merely suggest that more places considered 
to host the Summer Olympics were more developed. This is substantiated by the data where the mean 
GDPPC_BASE and GDPPC are significantly higher than those representing the World Cup.  
 
A comparison of the summary of statistics (Tables 6-7) of the second regression (Winter 
Olympics) indicates a wide variation: a minimum value of $1148.49, a maximum value of $57579.50, and 
an average of $21284.31. While the variance is somewhat wide, CV is 65% without controls and 61% 
with controls, the GDPPC numbers are significantly higher than either of the other two mega-sport 
events. The GDPPC_BASE starts at $12002, over $1000 per capita higher than the Summer Olympic 
considered countries and $2000 per capita higher than countries considered to host (and hosts) of the 
World Cup. This, in theory, fits where most Winter Olympic hosts are both Nordic, Western Europe, or 
North American developed countries and the GDPPC are historically higher.  
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Preliminary Model: 
 
World Cup:  
 
 
 
The first independent variables regarding time are constants to account for in the model, thus their 
relative insignificance is justified. The Host_WC variable is an indicator of the binary effect of hosting an 
event. It is the total intercept difference for hosting an event: B3 + B6. The variable Host_WC = 8535.50 
suggests that overall, countries that host the World Cup exhibit a positive $8535.50 difference in their 
gross domestic product per capita compared to non-hosts countries. The Post_WC variable indicates the 
binary effect of successfully hosting the World Cup. It represents the intercept difference for the non-host. 
Post_WC = 3437.06 indicates that on average, non-hosts experience a positive $3437.06 short-term effect 
on host GDPPC despite not hosting. This variable is relatively insignificant and will be tested for one of 
the econometric assumption violations. The variable Time_Post_WC captures the change in GDPPC 
growth non-host countries. Although statistically insignificant, its value of -72.06 indicates that overall, 
non-hosts countries exhibit a relatively horizontal (slightly negative) response in the years of not hosting 
the World Cup compared to the host countries. The main variable of interest is Time_Host_Post_WC, 
which indicates the difference in the change in long-run GDPPC growth. Its value of 699.07 indicates that 
overall, host countries exhibit a $699.07 increase in GDPPC growth over a ten-year span compared to 
non-host countries. The final variable, Host_Post_WC, represents the difference in difference of the 
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GDPPC intercept of host versus non-host countries. In essence, how much larger or smaller the intercept 
jump is (in terms of GDPPC) in that year of hosting the event. Its value of -20673.82 illustrates that on 
average, host countries exhibit a negative $2067.82 short-term change in GDPPC. This is surprising 
where macroeconomic theory would suggest the exact opposite. Due to a tourism influx, one can expect 
an increase aggregate spending in addition to a heavy increase government spending would result in 
short-run increase in the aggregate gross domestic product per capita. The data clearly suggests if a 
country hosts the World Cup, the resulting stimulation may not impact in the short-run as economic 
theory would normally indicate. 
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World Cup: With Controls  
 
 
 
The differences exhibited in this regression with controls have been restated throughout the paper. 
Although the R2 value increases dramatically and the t-statistics became more significant for the most 
part, all of the coefficients diminished distinctively. According to the data, all of the control variables 
appear to be significant, which intuitively makes sense, as they are macroeconomic independent variables 
correlating with the macroeconomic dependent variable across time. The final model will not take into 
account the control independent variables to ensure that the full impact of the binary and interactive 
independent variables is captured.  
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Summer Olympics: 
 
 
 
 
The first independent variables regarding time are constants to account for in the model, thus their 
relative insignificance is justified. The variable Host_SO = -10268.28 suggests that overall, countries that 
host the World Cup exhibit a negative -$10268.28 difference in their gross domestic product per capita 
compared to non-hosts countries. Post_SO = 1409.47 indicates that on average, non-hosts experience a 
positive $1409.47 short-term effect on host GDPPC despite not hosting. The variable Time_Post_SO 
captures the change in GDPPC growth non-host countries. Although statistically insignificant, its value of 
55.58 indicates that overall, non-hosts countries exhibit a relatively horizontal (slightly positive) response 
in the years of not hosting the World Cup compared to the host countries. The variable 
Time_Host_Post_SO has a value of -296.13, which indicates that overall, host countries exhibit a -
$296.13 decrease in GDPPC growth over a ten-year span compared to non-host countries. This would 
essentially suggest that it is not worth it for countries to host the Summer Olympics. Host_Post_SO 
exhibits a value of 6462.09, which illustrates that on average, host countries exhibit a positive $6462.09 
short-term change in GDPPC. Despite being insignificant, this positive change is in-line with the 
macroeconomic theory. This analysis of the impact of the Summer Olympic Games is somewhat 
problematic where most of the variables are insignificant in the model and the binary ‘Host_SO’ variable 
is negative. 
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Summer Olympics: With Controls 
 
 
 
The differences exhibited in this regression with controls have been restated throughout the paper. 
Similarly to the World Cup controlled regressions, the R2 value dramatically increased but at the cost of 
minimization of the coefficients of the independent variables. The final model will not take into account 
the control independent variables to ensure that the full impact of the binary and interactive independent 
variables is captured. 
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Winter Olympics 
 
 
 
 
The first independent variables regarding time are constants to account for in the model, thus their 
relative insignificance is justified. The variable Host_WO = -10554.72 suggests that overall, countries 
that host the World Cup exhibit a negative -$10554.72 difference in their gross domestic product per 
capita compared to non-hosts countries. Post_WO = -42882.61 indicates that on average, non-hosts 
experience a negative $42882.61 short-term effect on host GDPPC despite not hosting. The variable 
Time_Post_WO exhibited a value of 1302.19 indicates that overall, non-hosts countries exhibit a 
$1302.19 postive response in the years of not hosting the World Cup compared to the host countries. The 
variable Time_Host_Post_WO has a value of -940.78, which indicates that overall, host countries exhibit 
a $940.78 decrease in GDPPC growth over a ten-year span compared to non-host countries. This would 
essentially suggest that it is not worth it for countries to host the Winter Olympics. Host_Post_WO 
exhibits a value of 36939.058, which illustrates that on average, host countries exhibit a positive 
$36939.058 short-term boost in GDPPC. This analysis of the impact of the Winter Olympic Games also 
shows that hosting this event would go against general academic macroeconomic theory, but there are 
possible theories why. The data essentially indicates that although host countries may fair better in the 
short term, the non-host countries experience a better growth in GDPPC over the long-term and that 
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hosting of the Winter Olympics is not worth it. One possible theory as to why non-hosts may fair better is 
because of the type of countries that are chosen to host. For the most part, developed nations are 
considered to host (either host or are the runner-up in bidding) and it may fair that more ‘less-developed’ 
countries are chosen to host (to hopefully boost their economies). On the average, this would show that 
the more developed countries not chosen to host fair better than the ‘less-developed’ nations (I.e. Russia 
and South Korea).  
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Winter Olympics: With Controls 
 
 
 
The differences exhibited in this regression with controls are similar to those above. The R2 value 
increased, the t-statistics became partially less significant for the independent variables, while the control 
variables show their significance. The coefficient effects are lessened due to the addition of the control 
variables where their linear correlation with gross domestic product per capita only improves the value of 
the data on the expected value line. The final model will not take into account the control independent 
variables to ensure that the full impact of the binary and interactive independent variables is captured. 
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Violation of the Assumptions: 
 
World Cup: 
  
White Test: 
The White test determines if one or more of the independent variables is causing 
heteroscedasticity. In this test, the residuals squared are run as a function of all other independent 
variables. A white test performed illustrates the F-statistic of the set of heteroscedastic variables and 
probability of the F-statistic being significant. If the probability is less than 0.05 accompanied with a 
significant F statistic, then reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the data set has heteroscedasticity. 
If heteroscedasticity is found, the model will be corrected using a Newey-West correction.  
 
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
F-statistic = 40.69 
Prob(F-Statistic) = 0.00 
Reject Ho if Prob(F-statistic) < 0.05  
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
Reject H0 and conclude that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.  
Multicollinearity:  
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Multicollinearity: 
A way to detect multicollinearity is by calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which 
estimates the inflation on the standard error of each coefficient due to the presence of multicollinearity. In 
short, this test measures the degree to which the variation in an independent variable is explained by the 
other independent variables. To calculate VIF, a regression using one independent variable is run against 
all remaining independent variables. The R2 for this model is plugged into following equation: 
 VIF = ##$%&  
A generated rule of thumb indicates that a VIF value less than five can be accepted as the data not having 
any multicollinearity. Some research would suggest that any value less than ten is acceptable as well but 
further tests would also have to be utilized. Any value greater than ten essentially signifies that the 
variable identified exhibits multicollinearity.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: 
Variable VIF  Conclusion 
Host_WC 2.11 VIF < 10.0 suggests there is no multicollinearity due to Host_WC. 
Post_WC 11.44 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Post_WC 
Time_Post_WC 15.03 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Time_Post_WC 
Time_Host_Post_WC 13.13 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to 
Time_Host_Post_WC 
Host_Post_WC 13.89 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Host_Post_WC 
 
In conclusion, these calculated VIFS suggest a severe multicollinearity problem throughout the 
regression. The normal solution to a multicollinearity problem is to minimize the collinear variables.  A 
possibly significant error in this model, however, is that since the minimum independent variables for a 
diff-in-diff regression have already been met, there is no way to correct for the suggested 
multicollinearity.  
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Serial Correlation: 
Serial correlation occurs when corr(εi, εi-1) ≠ 0, the random error terms from different 
observations are correlated. This correlation indicates a pattern across the random error terms and, 
therefore, there is a pattern to what should be a random term. Serial correlation does not cause a bias on 
the coefficient of the independent variable, but rather may make the coefficients easier to accept.  
In any given model, serial correlation might depend upon how the data is organized. Per this 
model, it is possible for there to be serial correlation across a region. If a shock had occurred in a region 
early in the timeline, then it may influence the error team of the subsequent city but at a later point in 
time. More than likely, however, this model displays serial correlation across time where gross domestic 
product per capita is naturally a serially correlated variable as it depends on the past period’s value. To 
determine if this model exhibits serial correlation, we conduct the Breusch-Godfrey/LM Test. If it is 
found, serial correlation can be corrected by and estimating the standard errors using the Newey-West 
method.   
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Breusch-Godfrey LM Test 
 
The Breusch-Godfrey, or LM Test, is used for determining if there is serial correlation between the error 
terms of consecutive periods. In this test, a t-test will be run on the coefficient of the lagged residual. If it 
turns out to be significant, then it can be determined that there is serial correlation in the regression.   
 
H0: βResid(-1) ≤ 0  
HA: βResid(-1) > 0  
Level of Significance = 5 %  
tcritical: 1.960  
tcomputed: 46.45  
Decision rule: reject if tcomputed> tcritical  
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
Reject H0 and conclude that there is serial correlation in the model.  
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Summer Olympics: 
Heteroscedasticity:  
 
White Test  
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
F-statistic = 21.52 
Prob(F-Statistic) = 0.00 
Reject Ho if Prob(F-statistic) < 0.05  
 
 
 
Conclusion:  
Reject H0 and conclude that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.  
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Multicollinearity:  
 
 
 
 
Decision Rule: Acceptable VIF values < 10 < definite multicollinearity 
 
Table 2: 
Host_WC 6.62 VIF < 10.0 suggests there is no multicollinearity due to Host_WC. 
Post_WC 64.09 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Post_WC 
Time_Post_WC 78.86 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Time_Post_WC 
Time_Host_Post_WC 37.40 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to 
Time_Host_Post_WC 
Host_Post_WC 38.06 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Host_Post_WC 
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Serial Correlation: Correction with Newey-West 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
 
H0: βResid(-1) ≤ 0  
HA: βResid(-1) > 0  
Level of Significance = 5 %  
tcritical: 1.960  
tcomputed: 42.06  
Decision rule: reject if tcomputed> tcritical  
 
 
 
Conclusion:  
Reject Ho and conclude that there is serial correlation in the model.  
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Winter Olympics:  
Heteroscedasticity:  
White Test:  
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
F-statistic = 9.97 
Prob(F-Statistic) = 0.00 
Reject Ho if Prob(F-statistic) < 0.05  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion:  
Reject H0 and conclude that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.  
 
	 60	
	
Multicollinearity:  
 
 
 
 
Decision Rule: Acceptable VIF values < 10 < definite multicollinearity 
 
Table 3: 
Host_WC 5.78 VIF < 10.0 suggests there is no multicollinearity due to Host_WC. 
Post_WC 201.23 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Post_WC 
Time_Post_WC 192.77 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Time_Post_WC 
Time_Host_Post_WC 73.51 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to 
Time_Host_Post_WC 
Host_Post_WC 114.61 VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Host_Post_WC 
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Serial Correlation: Correction with Newey-West 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
 
H0: βResid(-1) ≤ 0  
HA: βResid(-1) > 0  
Level of Significance = 5 %  
tcritical: 1.960  
tcomputed: 34.58  
Decision rule: reject if tcomputed> tcritical  
 
 
 
Conclusion:  
Reject Ho and conclude that there is serial correlation in the model.  
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Final Model:  
 
The final model will not include any of the control variables to show the full impact of hosting a 
mega sport event. Previous analysis of regressions with the control variables illustrated that they lessened 
the effect of the binary and interactive independent variables. The final model also employs the 
Newey_West method to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Newey-West method 
produces standard errors for coefficients estimated by an OLS regression where the error structure is 
assumed heteroscedastic and somewhat serially correlated up to a determined lag. The traditional route in 
correcting for multicollinearity would be to limit the number of irrelevant variables. The final model uses 
the minimum amount of independent variables needed to satisfy the diff-in-diff requirement.  
 
World Cup: 
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Variable Interpretation: 
βHost_WC = 8535.50; On average, the host country experienced a positive $8535.50 impact on its 
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.  
βPost_WC = 3437.06; On average, the non-host country exhibits a positive $3437.06 change in GDPPC 
over a twenty-year period.  
βTime_Post_WC = -72.06; On average, the non-host country exhibits a slight negative $72.06 change in 
GDPPC growth over a twenty-period.  
βTime_Host_Post_WC = 699.07; On average, the host country exhibits a positive $699.07 difference in 
GDPPC growth compared to a non-host country over a twenty-year period.  
βHost_Post_WC = -20673.82; On average, the host country exhibits a negative $20673.82  difference in 
short-term GDPPC change compared to non-host countries over a one-year period.  
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Summer Olympics:  
 
 
 
Variable Interpretation: 
βHost_SO = -10268.28; On average, the host country experienced a negative $10268.28 impact on its 
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.  
βPost_SO = 1409.47; On average, the non-host country exhibits a positive $1409.47 change in GDPPC 
over a twenty-year period.  
βTime_Post_SO = 55.58; On average, the non-host country exhibits a slight positive $55.58 change in 
GDPPC growth over a twenty-period.  
βTime_Host_Post_SO = -296.13; On average, the host country exhibits a negative $296.13 difference in 
GDPPC growth compared to a non-host country over a twenty-year period.  
βHost_Post_SO = 6462.09; On average, the host country exhibits a positive $6462.09 difference in short-
term GDPPC change compared to non-host countries over a one-year period.  
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Winter Olympics: 
 
 
 
Variable Interpretation: 
βHost_WO = -10554.72; On average, the host country experienced a negative $10554.72impact on its 
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.  
βPost_WO = -42882.61; On average, the non-host country exhibits a negative $42882.61change in 
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.  
βTime_Post_WO = 1302.19; On average, the non-host country exhibits a positive $1302.19 change in 
GDPPC growth over a twenty-period.  
βTime_Host_Post_WO = -940.78; On average, the host country exhibits a negative $940.78 difference in 
GDPPC growth compared to a non-host country over a twenty-year period.  
βHost_Post_WO = 36939.12; On average, the host country exhibits a positive $36939.12 difference in 
short-term GDPPC change compared to non-host countries over a one-year period. 
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Conclusion: Is it worth it to host a mega-sport event?  
 
Preceding analysis provides insight into the theoretical and empirically measured impact of 
hosting a mega sport event. Unlike previous literature that only measure one event, this thesis empirically 
measured the effect across all three of the mega-sport events: World Cup, Summer Olympics, and Winter 
Olympics. Due to this, it is possible to not only conclude if this billion-dollar investment is worth it, but 
what type of event would best be host if a country decided to host one. Previous literature and basic 
macroeconomic theory have allowed for the drawing of a uniform hypothesis on the ten-year impact of 
hosting this type of event: the massive heighten of expenditure in preparation for the events accompanied 
with a generous influx of tourism would create a short run burst of economic activity with slight leveling 
off of GDPPC curve (slope) in the long run. To test this theory, three empirical regressions were run to 
measure the full impact of hosting the games and three more were run to test the impact of 
macroeconomic control variables.  
 
It was determined empirically that overall, a mega-sport event is not the most efficient use of 
resources and is probably not worth the investment. One of the exceptions to this, however, is dependent 
on the type of economy hosting the event: developed versus developing. Previous literature suggests that 
hosting a mega-sport event is only an investment that should be made by developed countries and that the 
risk of investment is significantly higher for developing countries. Developing countries usually lack the 
base resources to host such a tournament and end up incurring the incurred startup costs in infrastructure, 
which are already hard enough to overcome. Developed countries, on the other hand, are usually 
somewhat prepared with having multiple sports arenas and developed cities that could be easily 
refurbished or already are state-of-the-art. Since infrastructure is the largest investment any country or 
city has to sustain, developed countries spend millions of dollars less in aggregate versus the developing 
countries. Therefore, developed economies generally begin from a place of economic neutrality versus 
that of the underdeveloped economy/country. 
 
It can also be determined from the empirical model that if an attempt to host such an event did 
occur, then the best option would be to host the World Cup. It is a substantially larger event compared to 
either of the Olympic Games and would yield significantly more tangible benefits (revenue). Results 
indicated that although there may be a slight economic downturn relative to investment surrounding the 
event, countries that hosted the event yielded a significantly higher GDPPC growth curve over a ten-year 
span after hosting the World Cup. The Olympic Games, although almost requiring almost as much 
funding and preparation costs, are city or county specific and thus yield a fraction of the benefits. One of 
	 67	
	
the downfalls is the Olympic Games’ city-specific nature of the event is that the event is city-specific 
where it is unlikely that the revenue would spread beyond thirty miles outside the city. The lack of wide-
spread economic activity over the entire country is what can be captured and evaluated by the regression 
analysis. If city data had been used, the results may have been slightly different. Based on country data, 
however, it can be theorized that hosting the World Cup would be the best option.  
 
Upon meeting and discussing this thesis results with economists Dr. Thomas Miceli, Mr. Victor 
Matheson, Mr. Andrew Zimbalist, we decided to create a theoretical model that couple possibly resolve 
some of the issues surrounding hosting the Olympic Games. Since the econometric analysis indicated that 
hosting the World Cup could end up benefiting the host nation, some of the principles of the World Cup 
were adapted to an Olympic model. Some aspects that cannot be avoided or changed include: security, 
transportation, and events themselves. The major issues surrounding the Olympics, however, rest in sport-
specific infrastructure, size, and centralization. When considering sport specific infrastructure, this 
ultimately comes down to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) choosing hosts that are already 
better prepared. This reflects on Victor Matheson’s theory that developing countries should not use 
hosting a mega-sport event as opportunities to bolster their economies. The size of the competition has 
more to do with the duration of the event versus the international recognition. It will be assumed that 
these types of events already capture the attention of the world and thus do not need extra marketing. 
Certain events cannot be made longer where almost every race is a medal event with the preceding event 
the qualifying for the medal round. What could happen is that more time is allotted between each event 
where this would also give athletes extra time to rest. The largest issue with the Olympic Games is its 
centralization. History recognizes the Olympic Games as a tournament celebrating a coming together of 
athletes to show a lack in differences among people. This is what all the athletes stay in the Olympic 
village and compete in a maximum of four locations (with the exception of soccer and occasional other 
field sports). A brief note about this: The Olympics has a history of this and people like to preserve 
history, but any athlete competing international sporting event is respected based on his or her 
performance. If a city wants to successfully host the Olympics, history may need to be forgone in order to 
maximize business, as hosting mega-sport events have become a business decision.  
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The proposed adapted model is the decentralization of the competitions (not the opening 
ceremony) such that competitions are paired by rank and location. This way, an A-rank sport (Women’s 
Volleyball) is in the same city (location) as a B-rank Sport (Fencing, Judo) and a C-rank rank sport 
(speed-walking) to attract an evenly distributed amount of tourism. This also makes revenue streams 
easier where consumers can buy single event or a package of tickets based on location such that host 
would create a boosted viewership and revenue on the non-A-rank sports.22 This would theoretically spur 
economic activity in different places, which improves money-in-circulation and thus would increase those 
macroeconomic variables. The incurred costs of security and transportation would increase but these costs 
can be spread out over other cities such that one city is not suffering all of them. In theory, this could 
increase revenue and spread out the cost of hosting where the event is larger and longer, and would retain 
more tourism to yield an evener and wider boost in economic activity.  
 
 
 
  
																																																						
22 Victor Matheson, Andrew Zimbalist, Thomas Miceli; “Olympics Lecture” (University of Connecticut Law, April 12th, 2019.)  
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Errors and Possible Deviations: 
 
Possibilities and limitations of these results include: variation of destinations of the hosted events, 
empirical errors, and data retained. The reason the data could be skewed in favor of hosting the World 
Cup is because there is a larger variation in the types of countries that hosted the event: countries that 
hosted are on the upper scale of developing or developed. Therefore, the model would show a positive 
difference when comparing hosts to non-hosts. Summer Olympics and Winter Olympic hosts have less 
differences in GDPPC level between hosts and non-hosts; in fact, more developing countries or less 
developed countries hosted the Winer Olympics. Therefore, intuitively it would make sense that non-
hosts would fair just as well if not better than the hosts. Empirical error is always something to be 
accounted for and is another term for human error. The data retained was from the World Bank, if the 
source of that data is skewed, then this thesis results would also be incorrect. 
 
  
  
	 70	
	
 
Appendix:  
 
 
Appendix A: Economic Figures: 
 
Literature Review: Host GDPPC v. Runner-Up 
 
 
 
 
Real Money Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L’(i,Y)	
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Tourism Supply and Demand: Crowding Out Effect 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Supportive Figures 
Infrastructure Timeline: 
 
 
 
 
Infrastructure Type: 
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Appendix C: Graphical Hypothesis 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Tables 
 
 
Difference-in-Difference Model 
 
 Treatment Group Control Group 
Pre-Stimulus Treatment*pre Control*pre 
Post-Stimulus Treatment*post Control*post 
 
 
 
Appendix E: Equations 
 
Sample Diff-in-Diff 
Yi,t = β0 + β1[Time] + β2[Post_Stimulus] + β3[Time*Post_Stimulus] + β4*[Control] + εt 
 
Thesis Regression: 
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] + 
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + εt 
 
Thesis Regression with Controls:  
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] +	𝛿1[Time2] +	𝛿1[Time3] +	𝛿1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] + 
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + β7[Total_population] + β8[Inflation_rate] + εt 
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Appendix F: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS1_NO_CONTROLS_WC         
  Mean  Median  
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev. 
CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 9953.595 4596.88 48603.48 341.5928 11617.22 117% 4857354 6.57E+10 
TIME 31.68443 33 57 0 14.13759 45% 15462 97337.4 
TIME2 1203.365 1089 3249 0 884.8115 74% 587242 3.81E+08 
TIME3 50289.87 35937 185193 0 48622.99 97% 24541458 1.15E+12 
TIME4 2229374 1185921 10556001 0 2607402 117% 1.09E+09 3.31E+15 
HOST_WC 0.526639 1 1 0 0.499802 95% 257 121.6537 
POST_WC 0.522541 1 1 0 0.500004 96% 255 121.752 
TIME_POST_WC 18.42828 13 57 0 20.13035 109% 8993 197347.5 
TIME_HOST_POST_WC 9.829918 0 57 0 17.4287 177% 4797 147930.9 
HOST_POST_WC 0.272541 0 1 0 0.445724 164% 133 96.75205 
OLS1_WCONTROLS_WC         
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 10797.03 5617.742 48603.48 341.5928 12058.07 112% 4653520 6.25E+10 
TIME 32.79814 34 57 0 13.61236 42% 14136 79677.44 
TIME2 1260.585 1156 3249 0 866.6131 69% 543312 3.23E+08 
TIME3 52814.92 39304 185193 0 48100.09 91% 22763232 9.95E+11 
TIME4 2338350 1336336 10556001 0 2595047 111% 1.01E+09 2.90E+15 
HOST_WC 0.545244 1 1 0 0.498527 91% 235 106.8677 
POST_WC 0.522042 1 1 0 0.500094 96% 225 107.5406 
TIME_POST_WC 19.12993 14 57 0 20.58893 108% 8245 182278.7 
TIME_HOST_POST_WC 10.4594 0 57 0 18.08951 173% 4508 140709 
HOST_POST_WC 0.280742 0 1 0 0.449884 160% 121 87.03016 
EVENT_TIMELINE -0.06033 0 10 -10 5.935003  -26 15146.43 
GDPPC_BASE 8875.49 2982 48603.48 341.5928 12935.14 146% 3825336 7.19E+10 
TOTAL_POPULATION 75173651 56797087 2.93E+08 22037610 56794476 76% 3.24E+10 1.39E+18 
INFLATION_RATE 12.79106 5.017158 874.2457 -1.352837 48.05608 376% 5512.946 993036.3 
OLS2_NO_CONTROLS_SO         
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 23691.32 22061.16 60283.25 828.5805 13955.76 59% 7675987 6.29E+10 
TIME 37.19753 37.5 57 14 10.36118 28% 12052 34675.36 
TIME2 1713.988 1640.5 3481 256 777.7444 45% 555332 1.95E+08 
TIME3 76462.94 66460.5 205379 4096 49336.35 65% 24773992 7.86E+11 
TIME4 3540773 2692881 12117361 65536 2918352 82% 1.15E+09 2.75E+15 
HOST_SO 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.500773 100% 162 81 
POST_SO 0.506173 1 1 0 0.500735 99% 164 80.98765 
TIME_POST_SO 21.14815 24.5 57 0 21.85747 103% 6852 154312.9 
TIME_HOST_POST_SO 10.57407 0 57 0 18.73584 177% 3426 113383.2 
HOST_POST_SO 0.253086 0 1 0 0.435453 172% 82 61.24691 
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OLS2_WCONTROLS_SO         
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 20317.79 20087.54 51936.89 1398.479 11035.55 54% 4266735 2.55E+10 
TIME 32 32 50 14 8.306336 26% 6720 14420 
TIME2 1333.467 1296 2704 256 580.2408 44% 280028 70365984 
TIME3 52135.2 46656 140608 4096 32752.46 63% 10948392 2.24E+11 
TIME4 2113209 1679616 7311616 65536 1718913 81% 4.44E+08 6.18E+14 
HOST_SO 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.501195 100% 105 52.5 
POST_SO 0.52381 1 1 0 0.500626 96% 110 52.38095 
TIME_POST_SO 19.38095 26 50 0 19.11055 99% 4070 76329.52 
TIME_HOST_POST_SO 9.690476 0 50 0 16.64215 172% 2035 57884.88 
HOST_POST_SO 0.261905 0 1 0 0.440722 168% 55 40.59524 
EVENT_TIMELINE 0 0 10 -10 6.06977  0 7700 
GDPPC_BASE 10920.78 9646.252 19115.05 1398.479 6122.532 56% 2293365 7.83E+09 
TOTAL_POPULATION 93231492 57482591 2.98E+08 17065100 84811355 91% 1.96E+10 1.50E+18 
INFLATION_RATE 4.398682 3.127596 28.69759 -0.12790 3.869783 88% 923.7231 3129.82 
 
 
 
 
OLS3_NO_CONTROLS_WO         
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 21284.31 20670.82 57579.5 1148.494 13800.32 65% 6853548 6.11E+10 
TIME 31.13354 31 54 8 10.23086 33% 10025 33599.26 
TIME2 1839.444 1764 4096 256 839.5193 46% 592301 2.26E+08 
TIME3 85009.81 74088 262144 4096 56245.77 66% 27373159 1.02E+12 
TIME4 4086158 3111696 16777216 65536 3523494 86% 1.32E+09 3.99E+15 
HOST_WO 0.521739 1 1 0 0.500305 96% 168 80.34783 
POST_WO 0.546584 1 1 0 0.4986 91% 176 79.80124 
TIME_POST_WO 19.40373 23 54 0 18.93862 98% 6248 115133.5 
TIME_HOST_POST_WO 9.701863 0 54 0 16.54555 171% 3124 87875.38 
HOST_POST_WO 0.273292 0 1 0 0.446343 163% 88 63.95031 
OLS3_WCONTROLS_WO         
  Mean  Median  Maximum  
Minimum 
 Std. Dev. CV%  Sum  Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
GDPPC 22028.39 21427.26 57579.5 1148.494 13525.51 61% 6828801 5.65E+10 
TIME 31.46774 31 54 8 10.27694 33% 9755 32635.18 
TIME2 1872.087 1764 4096 256 838.3756 45% 580347 2.17E+08 
TIME3 87076.28 74088 262144 4096 56303.87 65% 26993647 9.80E+11 
TIME4 4205316 3111696 16777216 65536 3537297 84% 1.30E+09 3.87E+15 
HOST_WO 0.541935 1 1 0 0.499044 92% 168 76.95484 
POST_WO 0.548387 1 1 0 0.498458 91% 170 76.77419 
TIME_POST_WO 19.69355 24 54 0 19.0998 97% 6105 112723.9 
TIME_HOST_POST_WO 10.07742 0 54 0 16.7508 166% 3124 86702.14 
HOST_POST_WO 0.283871 0 1 0 0.451604 159% 88 63.01935 
EVENT_TIMELINE 0.332258 1 10 -10 6.100766  103 11500.78 
GDPPC_BASE 12002 10587.29 25646.7 2238.803 8037.756 67% 3720620 2.00E+10 
TOTAL_POPULATION 66954272 24746500 2.88E+08 3985258 84852574 127% 2.08E+10 2.22E+18 
INFLATION_RATE 8.916902 2.940634 338.4491 -13.70632 35.57829 399% 2764.24 391136.7 
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Appendix G: Preliminary Model 
 
World Cup:  
 
 
 
World Cup with controls:  
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Summer Olympics: 
 
 
 
Summer Olympics: With Controls 
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Winter Olympics 
 
 
 
Winter Olympics: With Controls 
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Appendix H: World Cup Econometric Assumption Tests 
 
White Test:  
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
Critical value = 31.410 
Obs*R-squared = 18.77 
Decision rule: reject H0 IFF and only if Obs*R-squared > critical value (Chi squared) 
 
 
 
VIFS 
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LM Test for serial correlation:  
 
 
Ho: There is no serial correlation 
 HA: There is serial correlation 
 Chi-Squared test at 5% level of significant 
 Degrees of freedom (# of lags) = p = 1 
 Critical value = 3.841 
 Reject Ho if Critical Value ≤ Observed R2 
 Observed R2 = 399.66 
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Appendix I: Summer Olympics Econometric Assumption Tests 
 
White Test  
 
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
Critical value = 31.410 
Obs*R-squared = 18.77 
Decision rule: reject H0 IFF and only if Obs*R-squared > critical value (Chi squared) 
 
 
Multicollinearity:  
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Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation: 
 
Ho: There is no serial correlation 
 HA: There is serial correlation 
 Chi-Squared test at 5% level of significant 
 Degrees of freedom (# of lags) = p = 1 
 Critical value = 3.841 
 Reject Ho if Critical Value ≤ Observed R2 
 Observed R2 = 275.30 
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Appendix J: Winter Olympics Econometric Assumption Tests 
 
White Test:  
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables 
Critical value = 31.410 
Obs*R-squared = 18.77 
Decision rule: reject H0 IFF and only if Obs*R-squared > critical value (Chi squared) 
 
 
 
 
 
Multicollinearity:  
 
 
	 83	
	
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation: 
 
Ho: There is no serial correlation 
 HA: There is serial correlation 
 Chi-Squared test at 5% level of significant 
 Degrees of freedom (# of lags) = p = 1 
 Critical value = 3.841 
 Reject Ho if Critical Value ≤ Observed R2 
 Observed R2 = 399.66 
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Appendix K: Final Model 
 
World Cup:  
 
 
Summer Olympics: 
 
 
 
 
 
	 85	
	
Winter Olympics: 
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